

## DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

June 30, 2006

**TO:** J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director  
**FROM:** R. Todd Davis/Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representatives  
**SUBJECT:** Activity Report for the Week Ending June 30, 2006

A. Building 9212 Documented Safety Analysis. BWXT has been working with YSO to resolve Documented Safety Analysis (DSA) weaknesses noted in the Board's letter of February 28, 2006. Recently, BWXT submitted a revised DSA to YSO. After YSO approval, BWXT will begin field implementation (expected to take approximately six months). BWXT has developed an implementation plan and will perform an Implementation Validation Review (IVR). Due to breadth and complexity of the 9212 DSA, BWXT has developed a supporting database that lists the controls and requirements from all safety basis documents and provides a mapping of controls to specific field implementation (e.g., procedures and surveillances). While BWXT noted that this database will be updated during DSA implementation, there is no definite plan to maintain this database after implementation is complete. The site reps. noted to BWXT and YSO management that this type of database has been used at other sites as a good tool for assisting with safety basis changes and with Unreviewed Safety Question evaluations after the DSA is implemented.

B. Vacuum Pump Filter - Criticality Safety. This week, YSO completed their Safety Evaluation Report and approved casting operations consistent with BWXT's Justification for Continued Operations (use only east side vacuum pumps and other new controls). BWXT performed an IVR and a Readiness Assessment to confirm safety basis implementation and facility readiness. Following these reviews, casting operations resumed on Wednesday. BWXT continues to evaluate the recommendations provided by the investigation team on this event and on the Y-12 Uranium Holdup Survey Program (see the 6/23/06 site rep. report). BWXT plans to brief YSO on path forward for broader corrective actions in mid-July.

C. Fissile Material Container Labeling. As previously reported, YSO had determined that fissile material container labeling at Y-12 did not ensure inclusion of all parameters important for criticality safety as required by ANSI/ANS standards (see the 3/4/05 site rep. report). During the Board's visit to Y-12 in March, BWXT stated that a new labeling system would be used for a Warehouse loading/storage activity by June and then be deployed for use in most enriched uranium movement and container loading activities by September (see the 3/31/06 site rep. report). The Warehouse activity is a trial loading and storage of the new Rackable Can Storage Box that is to be used in the Highly Enriched Uranium Materials Facility. BWXT personnel noted to the site reps. that the Warehouse loading/storage activity is now expected by early September following completion of startup reviews. BWXT still expects to deploy the new labeling system for broad use by late September.

D. Warehouse Shipment Activity. As reported on June 2<sup>nd</sup>, BWXT was preparing to ship the Tower Shield Facility - Systems for Nuclear Auxiliary Power (TSF-SNAP) reactor from the Warehouse to ORNL. On Saturday, the TSF-SNAP reactor was successfully moved to the Warehouse dock, lifted onto the transport vehicle and moved to ORNL.